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Situating Agency 
F. Vera-Gray 
 
 
There is a growing need to revisit our conceptual frameworks for understanding men’s violence 
against women and girls. Recent high-profile cases have raised public awareness of the extent of 
sexual violence; by using digital media, feminist activists have highlighted the everyday nature of 
men’s intrusive behaviour. The range of voices that give feminism as a political movement its 
complexity and reflexivity have been undoubtedly amplified. But the internet has also changed 
how we create, ingest and distribute information; often making our speaking to, a speaking over. 
Has our thinking paid the price? 
 
When we are caught up in the practicalities of provision, prevention, prosecution and policy-
making, we can easily miss opportunities to reflect on our differing perspectives and the 
unresolved tensions between them—to think about how our practice can inform our concepts, and 
how our concepts can inform our practice. Here I want to briefly sketch my own attempts to 
grapple with some of these issues – in particular the challenges of theorising women's agency in 
the context of men’s intrusion – and share how I discovered an untapped resource in the work of 
Simone de Beauvoir. 
 
Safety vs. freedom 
 
Across feminist perspectives there is what has been described as a ‘chronic need’ to theorise 
women’s agency, and in particular women’s embodied agency. That need is felt particularly in 
relation to debates on issues like prostitution and pornography, where it is often suggested that 
placing emphasis on the context in which women are making choices is equivalent to negating 
their ability to choose (a view exemplified in the recent decision of Amnesty International to 
support the decriminalisation of the prostitution system). It is also seen in the routine rejection of 
feminist self-defence as a rape prevention strategy. It seems we have reached a point where 
acknowledging that women can act through our bodies is equated with blaming us for when we 
can’t. 
 
The absence of a framework which recognizes both that women have agency and that it is limited 
by the context in which it is exercised can have devastating real world effects. An illustration can 
be found in the independent inquiry on child sexual exploitation in Rotherham, which revealed 
systemic failings in the statutory response—many of them rooted in a misunderstanding of what 
appeared on the surface to be young women’s agency. Instead of being seen as making choices in 
a context of coercion and constraint, young women were imagined as free and autonomous agents 
who were effectively choosing their own exploitation.  
 
Focusing on violence against women and girls as a context which structures and limits our 
freedom often prompts accusations of espousing a ‘victim feminism’ that undermines women’s 
sexual agency. But that perspective is itself unhelpfully reductive: it does not acknowledge the 
complex, multiple and uneasy ways in which women, individually and collectively, actually live 
our agency, and our oppression, within the current gender order.  
 
I came to recognise the need to expand our thinking about women’s embodied agency when I was 
doing research on what is commonly termed ‘street harassment’, meaning men’s intrusions on 
Original version published in Trouble & Strife  
20th May, 2016 
http://www.troubleandstrife.org/2016/05/situating-agency/  
 
 
 
 
2 
women in public space. I struggled to find a way of celebrating women’s skilful navigation of 
male intrusions – looking down, wearing headphones, dressing in dark colours, always sitting near 
the door – while at the same time acknowledging how this ‘safety work’ limits our freedom.  
 
‘Safety work’ is the term Liz Kelly uses to describe the strategising and planning that women and 
girls undertake in responding to, avoiding and/or coping with men’s violence. The vast majority of 
this work is pre-emptive: we often can’t even know if what we are experiencing as 
intrusive is intrusive without external confirmation. That confirmation generally comes in the 
form of escalation: he moves from staring to touching, he walks quicker behind you, he blocks 
your path. This escalation is what safety work is designed to disrupt. Women learn to quietly make 
changes, continually evaluating the situation to decide what constitutes ‘the right amount of 
panic’. Such work, repeated over time, becomes habitual: it is absorbed into the body as a kind of 
hidden labour. 
 
From the perspective of lived experience there is an opposition between taking actions to increase 
our safety and taking actions to increase our freedom—increasing one means decreasing the other. 
But from the perspective of theory, how should we conceptualise a woman’s decision to limit her 
freedom in exchange for an increased feeling of safety? On one hand it does not seem helpful to 
argue that she has no choice: a feminist argument that denies the ability of women and girls to act 
does nothing to increase their capacity for action. On the other hand there is something distinctly 
uncomfortable about claiming women’s ‘safety work’, which decreases their freedom, as an 
expression of women’s agency.  
 
 
Bringing back Beauvoir 
 
For me, it was Simone de Beauvoir’s understanding of the self as a situated embodied subject that 
provided a framework for understanding this tension.  
 
It might seem strange to talk about ‘bringing back Beauvoir’, since her groundbreaking work The 
Second Sex is referenced constantly in feminist theoretical discussions. But Beauvoir’s ideas have 
often been misrepresented or misunderstood. In recent debates on sex and gender, her work has 
been invoked to support both the voluntarist conception of gender favoured by queer theorists and 
the opposing view that emphasizes the biological realities of the female body, which are then 
gendered through social processes. In fact, both of these are incompatible with Beauvoir’s 
understanding of our lived body: a culturally inscribed material embodiment. The body-object, as 
described by biologists, simply does not exist in Beauvoir’s account which is located in a 
philosophical tradition focused on limiting abstractions and describing experience as lived. We 
can never experience the human body outside of it being someone’s body, a lived bodily-self 
situated in a particular place and time. When her work is fragmented, reduced to the occasional 
quote dropped into an argument to support one or other of the orthodox positions, we are missing 
the uniqueness of Beauvoir’s insights overall, and how they can help move us forward in our 
conceptual thinking about men’s violence against women.  
 
Historically, a major obstacle to English-speaking feminists’ understanding of Beauvoir was their 
reliance, for over fifty years, on an extremely problematic translation of The Second Sex. The 
translator, a male zoologist, cut a third of the original text, and had no understanding of the 
philosophical tradition that shaped Beauvoir’s own linguistic choices. There is now a new 
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translation which, though not without its own problems, goes some way towards giving the 
English-speaking reader a truer sense of Beauvoir’s ideas about the situation of women.  
 
The Second Sex provides a map for building theory that speaks to the commonality of women’s 
experience of men’s violence without losing sight of the way our varying social and personal 
histories shape the way violence is individually experienced. Beauvoir provides us with a theory 
of embodied selfhood that also accounts for the different meanings given to the individual and 
generated by the individual through their socio-historical location. Crucially, her account of the 
self as ‘always uniquely situated’ acknowledges the way agency is rooted in real, and often 
restrictive, contexts, without suggesting that any acknowledgment of the limits of particular 
situations effectively denies women autonomy.  
 
The situated self 
 
Beauvoir credited Jean-Paul Sartre with originating the idea of ‘situation’, but correspondence 
between the two of them that was published after her death revealed this as a misrepresentation. 
Rather what the letters contain is a series of disagreements about, and developments of, the work 
of German philosopher Martin Heidegger on the concept of ‘being-in-situation’.  
 
For Heidegger, human existence has the inescapable characteristic of ‘thrownness’. We are thrown 
without knowledge or choice into a world that was there before us and will remain after us, and in 
this thrownness we find ourselves in the world always already in a particular situation, again one 
that is not of our own choosing.  
 
For example, I was born as a white, able-bodied female in the early 1980s, in a small logging town 
on the North Island of New Zealand. None of these material conditions, their socio-historical 
meaning, or indeed my entry into the world itself, are expressions of my freedom; but my freedom 
nevertheless depends on them. My situation is what makes my freedom possible, as well as being 
the starting point from which I choose my projects. The influence of our situation on our choice of 
projects is seen in the way that situation acts to expand our possibilities in the world. A change to 
my birthplace would have changed my possibilities; a change to my body would have altered the 
starting point for my perspective on the world. From this situation we make choices from which in 
turn we derive our meaning. Our situation does not determine us, yet it does give us a location 
within the world through which it becomes meaningful – through which it becomes ‘ours’.  
 
Beauvoir developed Heidegger’s concept to talk about how this situation that we find ourselves 
thrown into, a situation which includes our embodiment and the associated meanings and 
possibilities, is both the point from which we make choices—and thus the basis of our freedom—
and the source of our limitations. Human ‘being’ is such that we have the ability to act on the 
world, and to make it our own through the taking up of projects we find meaningful (the project of 
ending men’s violence against women, for example). At the same time our situation is constituted 
by forces that are not of our making, forces that may act to limit the projects we choose and the 
meanings they have for us (would we have chosen the same projects if we did not have certain 
lived experiences—e.g., for many of us, experiences of men’s violence?)  
 
For Beauvoir we are both free and constrained, with neither lived reality cancelling out the other. 
Her philosophy insists on the ambiguity of human existence, rejecting simple binary oppositions 
between freedom and constraint, subject and object, actor and victim: it is not a question of 
either/or but of both/and. 
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Situated agency 
 
Beauvoir’s work offers important insights for current feminist theorizing about women’s agency, 
especially though not only sexual agency, as it is lived under patriarchy. Her concept of situation 
provides us with a theoretical tool that enables us to explore the ambiguous, ‘both/and’ position of 
the ‘victim-survivor’. It helped me to see that safety work is an expression of the way women are 
both acted on by, and capable of choosing to act within, the patriarchal gender order. The idea of 
situated agency, agency that is simultaneously free and restricted, can help us resist the temptation 
to see women’s responses to male violence and intrusion as evidence of their lack of agency, 
without feeling obliged to go to the other extreme and suggest that their actions are expressions of 
absolute freedom.   
 
There are connections here with Evan Stark’s theorisation of the constraints imposed on women 
by controlling partners as limiting women’s opportunities rather than their capacity to enact their 
life projects. Stark states that in reconceptualising domestic violence from an assault-based model 
to one of experienced reality, ‘no challenge was more formidable than conveying the extent of 
women’s resiliency, resistance, capacity and courage in the face of coercive control without 
minimizing the comprehensiveness of the strategy’. Such a claim connects to Beauvoir’s idea of 
‘situation’, referring to the total context in which and through which we choose our projects and 
so give our life meaning. For Stark, as for Beauvoir, freedom and agency are situated.  
 
The ideas developed by Beauvoir open up a space for feminists wanting to talk about Liz Kelly’s 
concept of the continuum of sexual violence as a constraining context for women, without denying 
women’s autonomy and our acts of resistance and resilience. Our choices, our actions, and even 
our desires are not free-floating: they spring from our material bodies, which are located in ways 
that open up some possibilities to us while closing down others. All agency is situated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
